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This research presents a bi-level stochastic network interdiction model on an attack
graph to enable a risk-averse resource constrained cyber network defender to optimally
deploy security countermeasures to protect against attackers having an uncertain budget.
This risk-averse conditional-value-at-risk model minimizes a weighted sum of the expected
maximum loss over all scenarios and the expected maximum loss from the most damaging attack scenarios. We develop an exact algorithm to solve our model as well as several
acceleration techniques to improve the computational effciency. Computational experiments demonstrate that the application of all the acceleration techniques reduces the average computation time of the basic algorithm by 71% for 100-node graphs. Using metrics
called mean-risk value of stochastic solution and value of risk-aversion, numerical results
suggest that our stochastic risk-averse model signifcantly outperforms deterministic and
risk-neutral models when 1) the distribution of attacker budget is heavy-right-tailed and 2)
the defender is highly risk-averse.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This thesis addresses the problem of optimally interdicting the cyber network of an
organization to minimize the expected maximum loss as well as the expected maximum
worst-case loss from cyber attacks with uncertain attacker budget. In this research, network
interdiction stands for network hardening by placing security countermeasures on potential attack paths. This is the frst study that considers modeling a risk-averse defenderattacker stochastic Stackelberg game based on an attack graph. This research proposes a
customized algorithm for solving the resulting bi-level risk-averse stochastic network interdiction model with relatively large problem instances. The goal of this research is to
(1) develop a risk-averse bi-level stochastic network interdiction model that minimizes the
mean-risk expected maximum loss from cyber attacks, (2) measure the robustness of the
optimal interdiction policy resulting from a risk-averse model than the optimal interdiction policy from a risk-neutral one, and (3) investigate the benefts of modeling multiple
attackers when computing the optimal interdiction policy.

1.1

Background and Motivation
Organizations and individuals are becoming more and more connected to facilitate the

communication and increase operational effciency. Unfortunately, this increased connec1

tivity is also making the organizations vulnerable to the cyber attackers. FBI crime report
of 2013 reported that more than 260,000 individual accounts were compromised which
resulted a total adjusted loss of $781 million. Some of the recent high-profle cyber attacks
are the attacks on Sony Entertainment, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Home Depot, and Target.
In 2014 a cyber attack on Sony Entertainment disclosed the company’s internal emails, fnancial information, and the information about upcoming movies [2]. In the recent history,
the largest attack was on JP Morgan Chase & Co. in 2014, which compromised information from about 76 million households and 7 million small business [3]. The attack on
Home Depot compromised about 56 million credit cards in 2014 [4], which is larger than
the theft of 40 million credit cards from a cyber attack on Target in 2013 [5].
As these incidents suggest, protecting cyber networks is becoming an important concern for many organizations to minimize the loss from attacks while exploiting the beneft
of increased connectivity. A deep understanding of the vulnerability of cyber systems is
needed to improve their security. One tool to analyze the vulnerability of cyber networks
and develop strategies to deploy security countermeasures like, frewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems to protect against cyber attacks, is the attack graph. Attack graphs
can be used to map an organization’s network topology to the potential attack paths.
Many researchers have studied the vulnerability of cyber systems using attack graphs;
however, most of them are logic-based models and ad-hoc in nature [6]. On the other
hand, a rigorous mathematical model that captures the interaction between a defender and
an attacker can provide more robust network interdiction decision. Moreover, in real life,
systems are vulnerable to multiple attackers, each with different skills, resources, etc. A
2

stochastic network interdiction model with uncertain attacker budget can capture the multiple attacker scenario to some extent, and thus better represents the real-life scenario than
the deterministic model. However, traditional stochastic programming typically seeks to
minimize expected loss does not take into account most damaging loss scenarios, which are
important because a sudden severe attack can force an organization to drive out of business.
So, risk-averse models provide more robust interdiction decisions than the risk-neutral approach, especially in the presence of variability of the random parameters. Therefore, a
new interdiction model is needed that models a risk-averse cyber network defender under
uncertainty.

1.2

Literature Review
Attack graphs were frst proposed as a network analysis tool by Phillips and Swiler [7],

who demonstrated that attack graphs can be generated given the following three inputs: a
database of generic attacks broken into atomic steps, information about the specifc system
to be analyzed with network topology and confguration, and an attacker profle that provides information about the attacker’s capabilities. Some research studies also presented
automatic attack graph generation tools, (e.g., [8]). There exist different variations of attack graphs such as attack trees [9], defense trees [10], attack countermeasure trees [11],
and vulnerability dependency graphs [12].
Network interdiction based on attack graphs involves generation of cut-sets to protect
the critical assets of an organization from cyber attacks. Cut-sets consist of a set of edges,
whose interdiction (removal) removes the path from initially vulnerable nodes (initial se3

curity conditions) to goal nodes (critical assets) on an attack graph. A complete cut-set
generation is to interdict all the edges of the cut-set, which is possible when the defender
of the network has enough budget. But, in reality the network defender always has a limited budget. There exist some research on enhancing the network security by generating
cut-sets. Dewri et al. [6] formulated a multi-objective optimization model on an attack tree
to select a subset of network hardening measures that minimizes the total cost of hardening
as well as the total damage to the system. Noel and Jajodia [1] developed a methodology
to optimally place intrusion detection system (IDS) sensors that provides complete coverage of potential attack paths using the fewest number of sensors. Alhomidi and Reed [13]
employed a genetic algorithm to fnd the minimum cut-set in dependency attack graphs.
In the network interdiction literature based on attack graphs, there are a few studies of
the interaction between the attacker and the defender as a two player Stackelberg game.
Dewri at al. [14] developed a multi-objective optimization model to present the interaction
between a network defender and attacker. Their model provides an optimal plan for placing security countermeasures on a network to maximize the return on investment for the
network defender. In these network hardening problems on attack graphs there are many
underlying uncertainties, such as the defender’s imperfect information about the attacker’s
exploits and the attacker’s imperfect information about network topology etc. Some studies considered these uncertainties in network interdiction models based on attack graphs.
Zonouz et al. [15] proposed a response and recovery engine (RRE) to model the attackerdefender interaction as a two-player stochastic Stackelberg game. The RRE utilized attack
response trees (ART) to analyze undesired system-level security events and to consider
4

the uncertainties in intrusion detection alert notifcations. Durkota et al. [16] introduced
a game theoretic model to capture the interaction between defender and attacker over a
dependency attack graph: the network defender attempts to reduce the risk of attacks by
optimally placing honeypots (fake hosts) with a limited budget. Their research was further
extended by Durkota et al. [17] where the authors assumed that the attacker doesn’t have
complete information about the location of the honeypots installed in the network by the
network defender.
In summary, there is a lack of rigorous mathematical models on cyber network hardening using attack graphs because most of the models are logic-based and ad-hoc models.
Also, according to Nandi et al. [18], the existing algorithms to solve the two-player games
over attack graphs are mostly based on either simulation or heuristics. A bi-level network
interdiction model over an attack graph was proposed by Nandi et al. [18], where the outer
level represents the defender’s objective of minimizing the maximum loss from attacks and
the inner level models the attacker’s objective of maximizing the breach loss to the network
defender. The authors formulated the model as a mixed-integer programming problem and
solve the resulting model by developing a constraint and column generation algorithm. Although this work by [18] provided the most rigorous mathematical models and algorithms
on network security over an attack graph to date, the authors assumed that an attacker can
breach a goal node through an arc with certainty if any countermeasure is not deployed on
that particular arc. However, in reality the success of an attack through an arc is not certain
even if no countermeasure is deployed on that arc. Poolsappasit et al. [19] considered
probability of success of attack through arcs. However, the probabilities are exogenous
5

to the model and are pre-calculated. Addressing the need for a stochastic model, a twostage stochastic programming model based on attack graphs was formulated by Bhuiyan
et al. [20], where the authors assumed the probability of success of attack through an arc is
uncertain. Their preliminary results showed that the mean value problem performed well
when the mean probabilities of success of attacks through arcs are signifcantly different.

1.3

Research Gap
We see from the literature review on network interdiction over an attack graph that there

is a scarcity of rigorous mathematical analysis on attack graph network interdiction. Moreover, most of the studies in the existing literature modeled the defender-attacker interaction
using one defender and one attacker on an attack graph (e.g.,[18, 20]). However, a network
is usually attacked by many attackers having different capabilities and resources. So, to
have a robust interdiction decision, the network defense model should consider multiple
attackers with different capabilities. Multiple attackers with different capabilities and resources can be modeled by considering attackers with different budgets. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the existing research considered risk-aversion in attack graph based
network interdiction models. That said, a risk-neutral optimal solution may not be robust
in a non-repetitive decision making that occurs in cyber security, in which large attacks can
be crippling to an organization. In this case, an interdiction policy from a risk-averse approach that considers the variability of the random parameters is more robust to minimize
the expected maximum loss from the most damaging attack scenarios.

6

This research falls in the class of network interdiction problems, as we are interdicting
attack paths by removing arcs through the deployment of security countermeasures on the
arcs. There are several studies of the application of network interdiction in a two-player
Stackelberg game setting. Such areas include interdicting a terrorist’s nuclear weapons
project where the interdictor’s goal is to maximize the minimum completion time of the
project [21, 22], interdicting or mitigating the disruptions to large-scale electrical power
grids that can be caused by terrorist’s attack [23, 24], and hedging against worst-case facility losses to maximize the coverage [25].
There are also a considerable amount of research on different applications of stochastic
network interdiction that model bi-level problems, such as protection of facilities against
uncertain attacks to minimize the worst-case damage [26], interdiction of arcs of a network
to maximize the length of shortest path [27], and interdiction of nuclear smuggling networks [28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. The modeling perspective of the studies on nuclear smuggling
interdiction is similar to our work, especially that of [31], where the sensors are installed
on the arcs of a network to minimize the maximum probability of an evader to traverse
undetected. Similarly, in the present work, we are interdicting a subset of arcs by deploying security countermeasures to minimize the mean-risk expected maximum loss resulting
from cyber attacks. However, in [31], the authors assumed that in a specifc realization the
attacker can select only a single origin-destination path. In contrast to that, in our work,
an attacker can choose multiple origin-destination path in a specifc realization. Moreover,
unlike their work, we model multiple attackers, each with a different budget. Also, un-

7

like our risk-averse network interdiction model, the above research provides risk-neutral
models.
To the best of our knowledge, few research studies on bi-level stochastic network interdiction problems considered a risk-averse objective. Song and Shen [33] developed a
risk-averse chance constrained model for a stochastic shortest path interdiction problem.
The goal of the risk-averse interdictor (leader) is to maintain a high probability that the
follower has to travel a longer distance than a given threshold. The authors sought to optimize Value-at-Risk (VaR) and proposed a branch-and-cut algorithm to solve the risk-averse
chance constraint model. The authors reformulated their bi-level model into a single level
one using duality. Collado et al. [34] proposed a risk-averse solution approach to a stochastic path detection problem, where the protector allocates security resources on a network
to detect the path of invader with high probability. The authors employed a mean-upper
semideviation risk measure for the risk-aversion approach. The risk-averse problem was
reformulated to a single level linear mean-semideviation model. In all of these existing
studies the inner level problem was a linear program, resulting in the conversion of the bilevel model to a single-level one using duality. However, in this research the inner level is
an integer program, making the resolution of the problem more computationally diffcult.
The research gap discussed above suggests that more research needs to be conducted on
network interdiction over attack graphs, especially that considers multiple attackers with
different budget and risk-averse network defender. Also, more research is needed on the
general risk-averse stochastic network interdiction problem that develops new models and
solution approaches.
8

1.4

Contributions
This thesis extends the existing literature in a number of directions. This research

extends the stochastic network interdiction literature by introducing a new mathematical
model and algorithm. This research is also the frst to model a risk-averse cyber network
defender on network hardening over an attack graph. Our research is a signifcant extension of Nandi et al. [18] which presented the most rigorous mathematical models and
algorithms on network hardening over an attack graph. Though our algorithm is based on
the deterministic framework proposed by Nandi et al. [18], we modify the algorithm to
incorporate stochastic network interdiction and risk-aversion.
Specifcally, we make the following contributions in this thesis: (1) formulate a bi-level
risk-averse mixed-integer stochastic programming model over an attack graph incorporating conditional-value-at-risk as a risk measure, (2) propose a customized constraint and
column generation algorithm to solve the risk-averse model, (3) present novel acceleration
techniques that speed up the basic algorithm signifcantly to solve relatively large-sized
problems, (4) provide experimental results to demonstrate the beneft of modeling multiple
attackers, and (5) provide experimental results that yield insights about the effect of riskaversion on the optimal interdiction policy and the signifcance of solving a risk-averse
stochastic network interdiction problem rather than a risk-neutral and a deterministic one.
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CHAPTER II
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

This research studies the interaction of a risk-averse cyber network defender with attackers in a stochastic Stackelberg game over an attack graph. In this game, the defender
acts frst and places security countermeasures on potential attack paths through which the
attackers can breach the critical assets of the organization. The defender pays a security
cost to place a security countermeasure on an arc, and the total cost of countermeasure deployment cannot exceed the budget of the defender. Realizing the defender’s action, each
attacker generates an attack plan to maximize the loss to the defender. The attacker also
has to incur an attack cost for using an arc and the total attack cost should be within the
individual attacker’s budget. The budgets of the attackers are known to the defender only
in distribution. The objective of the defender is to minimize the expected maximum loss
from the attackers as well as the expected maximum worst-case loss.

2.1

Attack Graphs
Attack graphs represent the potential attack paths in a network. In an attack graph a

node can represent a security condition or state of an attack, or a vulnerability. An arc
(edge) between nodes stands for an attacker’s action or exploit. The tail node and the head
node of an arc are the pre-condition and the post-condition, respectively. To see how a
10

network can be represented by an attack graph, consider a simple example that was frst
described in Noel and Jajodia [1] and is shown in fgure 2.1 in which a frewall is installed
to block outside attack. But, there could be multiple paths that enable outside attackers to
compromise the mail server. These potential attack paths are demonstrated in the attack
graph of this network in fgure 2.2. The red ovals and the green rectangles represent the initial network conditions and attacker exploits, respectively. For example, the nessus vulnerability 10671 of the web server is represented by the initial condition nesssus.10671.
The iis_decode_bug(attack, web) is an attacker exploit that requires two preconditions, nessus.10671 and execute (attack), to be satisfed. Completion of
this exploit results in the post-condition execute (web). The attacker can continue to
make other exploits successful by satisfying the conditions and eventually meet the overall
attack goals which are shown by blue hexagons.

Figure 2.1: A simple network (adopted from Noel and Jajodia [1])

11

Figure 2.2: Attack graph of the small network (adopted from Noel and Jajodia [1])

Figure 2.3: Attack graph example of level = 3

12

2.2

Optimization Problem
The defender-attacker stochastic Stackelberg game over an attack graph can be formu-

lated as a risk-averse bi-level stochastic optimization problem. The outer level represents
the defender’s problem and the inner level is the attacker’s problem. Both the defender
and the attackers have limited budget. We model multiple attackers by considering a single
attacker with an uncertain budget. The defender of the network estimates the budget of the
attackers from a probability distribution with known parameter values. In the stochastic
problem, we consider fnite number of scenarios, each representing a particular attacker.
With the limited budget, the defender interdicts the best subset of arcs to minimize the
expected maximum loss over all scenarios as well as to minimize the expected maximum
loss from the most damaging attack scenarios. The expected maximum loss is the probability weighted maximum losses from all the attack scenarios. The decision of interdicting
a set of arcs is referred to as an interdiction plan. We refer to the summation of the expected maximum loss over all scenarios and the expected maximum loss from the most
damaging attack scenarios as the mean-risk expected maximum loss. It is assumed that if
an arc is interdicted, no attack is possible through that arc. Given a set of interdicted arcs,
an attacker chooses an optimal attack plan within the limited budget to maximize the loss
to the defender. An attacker starts the attack from an initially vulnerable node (initial security condition) and continues penetrating the network through the transition nodes until
breaching a goal node (critical asset). An attack path consists of the arcs from an initially
13

vulnerable node to a goal node. A set of one or more attack paths constitute an attack plan.
It is assumed that an attacker has to incur attack cost for an arc only once even if the arc
is used to breach multiple goal nodes in an attack plan, making the attacker’s problem a
discrete optimization problem. Also, we assume that a goal node is damaged completely
if it is breached once.

2.3

Example
Figure 2.3 shows an example of the attack graphs used in this research. Each node is

labeled as “l-b”, where “l” is the node index and “b” is the loss incurred if that node is
breached. The red nodes are the initially vulnerable nodes (initial security condition), the
blue nodes are the transition nodes, and the green nodes are the goal nodes (critical assets).
The defender of the network incurs a loss if an attacker can breach one of the goal nodes.
The arc weights represent the probability of success of an attack through that arc.
To understand the interaction between the defender and the attacker on the stochastic
programming framework, let’s consider a small example optimization problem. We assume two attackers with attack budget of 2 and 3 units, respectively; using an arc at least
once costs an attacker 1.0 units. We consider the two attack scenarios to occur with equal
probability.
If we assume the defender has a budget of 0 units, no interdiction is possible. Now,
with no interdiction, the optimal attack plan of attacker 1 is to breach goal node 5 through
the attack path 1-2-5 which results in a maximum loss of 12.47 (=0.84×0.742×20) to the
defender at a cost of 2.0 to the attacker. The optimal attack plan of attacker 2 is to use the
14

attack paths 1-2-5 and 1-2-4 that results in a maximum loss of 15.11 (=0.84×0.742×20
+ 0.84×0.63×5) at a cost of 3.0 to the attacker. Thus, the expected maximum loss to the
defender is 13.79 (=0.50×12.47 + 0.50×15.11).
Now, if we assume that the defender has a budget of 1 unit, and the defender interdicts
arc (1, 2), the optimal attack plan of attacker 1 is to use path 0-2-5 resulting in a maximum
loss of 11.72. The attacker 2 chooses the attack paths 0-2-4 and 0-2-5 that leads to a
maximum loss of 14.21. The resulting expected maximum loss from the two scenarios
becomes 12.96.
This example optimization problem, which sought to minimize the expected maximum
loss, raises an important question: if defender was also concerned with minimizing the risk
of the most damaging scenarios, would the defender’s solution change? To address this
question, we incorporate conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR) into our stochastic programming framework. This risk-averse approach is described in detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION

In this chapter, we formulate the risk-averse bi-level problem as a two-stage stochastic
mixed-integer programming model. The frst-stage model represents the outer level which
is referred as M IN M AX E XP L OSS. The second-stage model stands for the inner level and
is referred as M AX L OSS. Before presenting the mathematical formulation, the parameters
and variables are listed in table 3.1.
As we consider risk-aversion in the two-stage stochastic programming model, the riskaverse framework is described in the following sub-section.

3.1

CVaR Measure in Stochastic Programming
In this research, the attacker budget is a random parameter which is estimated by the

defender from a probability distribution. So, the maximum loss to the defender in different scenarios is also a random variable which in turn makes the expected maximum loss a
random variable as well. In a risk-neutral approach, we would compare only the expected
values in deciding the optimal solution to the stochastic programming problems. But, it is
crucial to consider the effect of variability and take risk measures as preference criteria in
comparison of the random variables [35]. Mean-risk models are developed in stochastic
programming to incorporate the risk measures that provides a robust solution in the pres16

ence of variability. The mean-risk function of a stochastic programming problem involves
a risk-measure component in addition to the traditional expected value component:

min E(g(x, ξ)) + λr (g(x, ξ))

Table 3.1: Notation.
(a) Parameters

Parameters
L(i)
E(i)
lt
pij
ps
Cijd
Cija
λ
α
Bd
Ba
Ap
cbp
Pps
Pks

Description
Set of arcs leaving node i
Set of arcs entering node i
Loss due to breach of a goal node t ∈ Nt
Probability of success of attack through arc (i, j)
Probability of scenario s
Cost of deploying countermeasures on arc (i, j) ∈ A
Cost of using arc (i, j) ∈ A in one or more attack paths
Risk coeffcient
Level of confdence
Defender’s budget
Attacker’s budget
Set of arcs in path p
Loss due to breach of a goal node through path p
Probability of path p in scenario s
Set of paths in attack scenario s at iteration k
(b) Variables

Variables
xij
wij
zi
yij
η
vs
up

Description
1 if countermeasures are deployed on arc (i, j), 0 otherwise
1 if arc (i, j) is used for one or more attacks, 0 otherwise
Probability of node i being breached
Product of zi and wij
1st stage variable (represents the value-at-risk, Va R)
Excess variables for scenarios s ∈ S
1 if path p is removed, 0 otherwise
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(3.1)

Here, g(x, ξ) is the second-stage problem for a particular realization of the random
parameter ξ, x is the frst-stage decision vector, r is a specifc risk measure and λ is the
risk coeffcient. The value of the risk coeffcient depends on the degree of risk preference
of the decision maker. The risk coeffcient represents the exchange rate of mean cost for
risk. In the existing literature, several different risk measures are presented; for example,
Ahmed [36] presented several computationally tractable mean-risk models. In our riskaverse approach, we incorporate a conditional-value-at-risk measure which is a well known
downside risk measure. Artzner et al. [37] presented some axiomatic properties required
for risk measures to be coherent and the authors showed that the CVaR is a coherent risk
measure.
In this study, we incorporate the CVaR approach similar to Noyan [35] and Schultz
and Tiedemann [38]. Both in our study and in Schultz and Tiedemann [38] the recourse
function contains integer variables. Due to the mixed-integer recourse, convexity of the objective function in a mean-risk model does not hold. The risk measures should have such
properties that the corresponding mean-risk mixed-integer stochastic programs are structurally sound and computationally tractable to make them applicable to real-life problems
[38]. Schultz and Tiedemann [38] demonstrated that the CVaR measure possesses these
requirements.
The conditional-value-at-risk quantifes the expected value of the α−tail distribution
of g(x, ξ). Now, the mean-risk function (3.1) is as follows:

min E(g(x, ξ) + λCV aRα (g(x, ξ))
18

(3.2)

where, CV aRα stands for the conditional-value-at-risk at the level of confdence α. In
the context of our work, the CV aRα computes the expected value of the excess losses that
exceeds the value-at-risk at confdence level α. Value-at-risk (V aRα ) is also a risk measure
that provides an upper bound on the loss that is exceeded only with a probability of 1 − α.
The value-at-risk can be mathematically expressed as:

V aRα (g) = inf {η : ϕ(x, η) ≥ α}

(3.3)

Where, ϕ(x, η) is the distribution function of g(x, ξ), and level of confdence α ∈ (0, 1)
The relation between the CV aRα and V aRα corresponding to the random variable g
can be expressed as:

CV aRα (g) = E(g | g ≥ V aRα (g))

(3.4)

The CV aRα is also referred to as tail V aR at confdence level α. We can compute the
conditional-value-at-risk at confdence level α from the following expression:

CV aRα (g) = infη∈R {η +

1
E(max(g − η), 0}
1−α

(3.5)

According to Schultz and Tiedemann [38], for a fnite number of scenarios ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ....., ξ |S| and
the corresponding probabilities p1 , p2 , ....., p|S| the minimization of conditional-value-atrisk
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min CV aRα g(x, ξ)

(3.6)

can be reformulated as

min {η +

1 X s s
p v : W y s = hs − T s x}
1 − α s∈S

where, v s ≥ (qs )T ys − η,
y s ≥ 0,

(3.7)

s = 1, 2, ..., | S |

s = 1, 2, ..., | S |

x∈X

η∈R
v s ≥ 0,

s = 1, 2, ..., | S |

Where, the v s represents the excess loss in the scenarios s = 1, 2, ...., | S | and is
considered as an additional second-stage variable. The variable η acts as an additional
frst-stage variable. The CVaR measure is incorporated to the bi-level two-stage stochastic programming model and the resulting mean-risk model is presented in the following
subsection.

3.2

Mean-Risk Two-Stage Stochastic Programming Model
The frst-stage model represents the defender’s objective which is to minimize the ex-

pected maximum loss from all the scenarios as well as to minimize the expected maximum
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loss from the most damaging attack scenarios. The frst-stage problem is formulated as
follows(M IN M AX E XP L OSS) :

1 X s s
min
ps f s (x̂) + λ η +
pv
1
−
α
s∈S
s∈S
s.t.

!

X

(3.8a)

Cijd xij ≤ Bd

(3.8b)

v s ≥ f s (xˆ) − η
xij ∈ {0, 1}

∀s ∈ S
∀(i, j) ∈ A

η∈R
vs ≥ 0

(3.8c)
(3.8d)
(3.8e)

∀s ∈ S

(3.8f)

The objective function (3.8a) has two components, where the frst component computes
the expected maximum loss over all the scenarios and the second component models the
CVaR measure. Constraint (3.8b) ensures that the total cost of deploying countermeasure
on a subset of arcs should be within the defender’s budget. Constraints (3.8c) computes
the excess loss for all the attack scenarios.
The second-stage (sub-problem) stands for a particular realization of the random attacker budget. The sub-problem from each scenario represents an individual attacker (inner
level) whose objective is to maximize the total loss to the defender for a given interdiction
plan of the defender x̂ determined by the frst-stage (outer level) model. We refer to the
following formulation of the inner problem as M AX L OSS NLP.
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ˆ = max
f s (x)

X

l t zt

(3.9a)

t∈Nt

s.t.

X

Cija wij ≤ Ba

(3.9b)

(i,j)∈A

wij ≤ 1 − x̂ij
X

zj ≤

∀(i, j) ∈ A

pij zi wij

∀j ∈ N Ni

(3.9c)
(3.9d)

(i,j)∈Ej

X

wij ≤ 1

∀j ∈ N Ni

(3.9e)

(i,j)∈Ej

wij ∈ {0, 1}
0≤z≤1

∀(i, j) ∈ A
∀j ∈ N

(3.9f)
(3.9g)

The objective function (3.9a) calculates the maximum total loss to the defender or the
maximum total reward acquired by the attacker given an interdiction plan of the defender.
Constraint (3.9b) enforces that the total attack cost cannot exceed the attacker’s budget.
Each of the constraints (3.9c) ensure that no attack is possible through an arc if that arc
is already interdicted by the defender in the frst-stage model. Our model ensures that the
attacker chooses an arc with maximum attack success probability to breach a node, and
this is enforced by constraints (3.9d). Constraints (3.9e) ensure our assumption that the
attack cost is incurred once for an arc even if the arc is used in multiple attack paths.
In the M AX L OSS NLP(3.9) formulation, the constraint (3.9d) contains the product of
the two variables wij and zi that makes M AX L OSS NLP a nonlinear formulation. However, this type of non-linearity can be linearized by employing standard procedures. The

22

linearization technique introduces an additional continuous variable yij which replaces the
product term zi wij . The linearization also introduces some additional linearization constraints. We refer to the linearized second-stage model as M AX L OSS MIP which is given
as follows:

ˆ = max
f s (x)

X

l t zt

(3.10a)

t∈Nt

s.t

X

Cija wij ≤ Ba

(3.10b)

(i,j)∈A

wij ≤ 1 − x̂ij
X

zj ≤

∀(i, j) ∈ A
∀j ∈ N Ni

pij yij

(3.10c)
(3.10d)

(i,j)∈Ej

yij ≥ zi − (1 − wij )
yij ≤ wij

∀(i, j) ∈ A

yij ≤ zi
X

∀(i, j) ∈ A

∀(i, j) ∈ A

wij ≤ 1

∀j ∈ N Ni

(3.10e)
(3.10f)
(3.10g)
(3.10h)

(i,j)∈Ej

wij ∈ {0, 1}
0≤z≤1

∀(i, j) ∈ A
∀j ∈ N

0 ≤ yij ≤ 1

∀(i, j) ∈ A

(3.10i)
(3.10j)
(3.10k)

The M AX L OSS MIP is a mixed-integer linear programming formulation of the secondstage problem. Constraints (3.10d)-(3.10g) are introduced to the model due to the lineariza-
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tion of the nonlinear constraint (3.9d) of M AX L OSS NLP (3.9). The objective function and
the other constraints of M AX L OSS MIP are the same as those of M AX L OSS NLP.
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CHAPTER IV
SOLUTION ALGORITHM

This chapter details the solution methodology for solving our risk-averse bi-level stochastic programming model. Most of the research in the existing literature contains binary variables only in the outer level, a situation that is computationally advantageous because a bilevel model can be reformulated as a single level model by taking the dual of the inner level
model [39, 27]. However, some studies have dealt with the solution of bi-level problems
that involve binary variables in both levels [40, 21, 18]. Moore and Bard [41] discussed
the diffculties faced in the solution of mixed-integer bi-level programming. Moreover, the
diffculty of this type of bi-level problems further increases if the binary variables of the
outer level parameterize the inner level constraints [40, 18], as is the case in our model.
In our research, the binary variables exist in both inner and outer level. So, we cannot
utilize duality of the inner problem to make the whole problem as a nested min-min problem. Additionally, we are solving a risk-averse stochastic mixed-integer bi-level problem
which also makes our problem computationally challenging. So, to solve the formulated
model, we develop a customized constraint and column generation algorithm that is based
on the algorithm proposed by Nandi et al [18]. Algorithms using a similar framework are
also proposed by Brown et al. [21] and Alderson et al. [42]. However, each of these pre-
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vious studies are on deterministic bi-level problems. We extend their framework to incorporate the solution strategies for stochastic mixed-integer programming and conditionalvalue-at-risk framework. The solution of the outer level problem (i.e., the master problem)
provides the lower bound of the algorithm. The upper bound of the algorithm is obtained
by solving the scenario sub-problems (M AX L OSS MIP (3.10)) for a given solution from
the outer level problem.

4.1

Upper Bound
A feasible solution of the outer level problem (M IN M AX E XP L OSS (3.8)) provides

a feasible interdiction plan of the network defender. For the given feasible interdiction
plan(x̂k ) at any iteration k, the attackers try to maximize their gain. We solve each scenario
sub-problem (M AX L OSS MIP (3.10)) at iteration k for a given interdiction plan. At an
iteration k, to compute an upper bound, we calculate the expected value of the optimal
objective values of the scenario sub-problems as well as the CVaR at confdence level α.
So, f (x̂k ) =

P

s∈S

ps f s (x̂) + λ(η +

1
1−α

P

s∈S

ps v s ) is an upper bound of our algorithm

at iteration k. As our problem is a minimization problem, the upper bound (UB) up to
0

iteration k is the minimum of f (x̂k ) found through iteration k, i.e, U B ≤ f (x̂k ) for
k 0 = 1, . . . , k.

4.2

Lower Bound
To compute a lower bound of our algorithm, we use a technique similar to the M INA-

T R ISK

model of Nandi and Medal [43] that minimizes the number of nodes that are at risk

of infection from other already infected nodes. In this thesis, we formulate an algorithm
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for solving our specifc defender’s problem. We refer to our developed algorithm for calculating the lower bound as M IN M EAN R ISK(Āk ). The A¯k is the set of arcs that are used
by the attackers up to iteration k. We obtain this set by solving the M AX L OSS MIP(3.10)
problem at iteration k of the algorithm. Let, f (Āk ) be the optimal objective value and x̂k
be the optimal solution of the M IN M EAN R ISK(Āk ) model. Then the current lower bound
0
(LB) at iteration k is the maximum of f (Āk ) found through iteration k, i.e., LB ≥ f (A¯k )

for k 0 = 1, . . . , k.
The model providing the lower bound is formulated as follows(M IN M EAN R ISK(Āk )):

f (Āk ) = min θ

(4.1a)
⎛

s.t.

θ≥

X

ps ⎝

s∈S

⎞
X

lt ztks ⎠

t∈Ntks

1 X s ks
+λ η k +
pv
1 − α s∈S
s ks
zjks ≥ pij
zi − xij

∀k ∈ K

(4.1b)

∀(i, j) ∈ Aks , ∀k ∈ K, ∀s ∈ S

(4.1c)

∀i ∈ NIks , ∀k ∈ K, ∀s ∈ S

ziks = 1
X

!

Cijd xij ≤ Bd

(4.1d)
(4.1e)

(i,j)∈A

v ks ≥

X

lt ztks − η k

∀k ∈ K, ∀s ∈ S

(4.1f)

t∈Ntks

xij ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ A

(4.1g)

ηk ∈ R

∀k ∈ K

(4.1h)

v ks ≥ 0

∀k ∈ K, ∀s ∈ S

(4.1i)
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In this formulation, the objective function (4.1a) and the constraint (4.1b) together
ensure that the objective of this model is to minimize the maximum of all the mean-risk
expected maximum losses through iteration k. Each constraint (4.1c) ensures that if a node
j is at risk of breach through arc (i, j) in an attack scenario s at iteration k, this arc must
be interdicted to protect the node j from being breached by an attacker. So, to protect a
node j, all the incoming arcs need to be interdicted if the tail node of the arc is at risk of
breach. The initially vulnerable nodes used in an attack scenario s at iteration k are always
at the risk of breach. This condition is satisfed by the constraints (4.1d). Constraint (4.1e)
represents the defender’s budget constraint. Each of the constraints (4.1f) compute the
excess loss corresponding to the attack scenario s at iteration k.
In this formulation, we generate a new set of variables for the nodes and arcs that
are used in the attack scenarios s through iteration k. Also, we generate the associated
constraints (4.1b), (4.1c), (4.1d), and (4.1f) to represent the connectivity of the nodes.
To distinguish between the different attack scenarios, a new variable zjks is generated
for node j if the node is used in attack scenario s at iteration k. At each iteration of
theM IN M EAN R ISK(Āk ) model, the constraints (4.1b) forces the lower bound closer to optimal solution which resembles an optimality cut in a L-shaped algorithm. As the algorithm
proceeds, the new variables and constraints associated with the attack scenarios are added
to the model, the solution of the master problem moves towards the optimal solution.
The proof of the theorem 4.2 explains the theoretical justifcation that the master problem provides a valid lower bound to the algorithm.
Theorem. The master problem (MinMeanRisk) provides a valid lower bound.
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Proof. According to Nandi et al. [18], an attack is a tree in the attack graph. In our
M IN M EAN R ISK (4.1) formulation, the set of constraints (4.1c), (4.1d), and (4.1f) add
| S | attack trees to the attack graph used by the master problem at each iteration of
the algorithm. Here, s ∈ S stands for the scenario index. The fact that each distinct
attack tree corresponding to a scenario in a set is due to the distinct attacker budgets in
the scenarios. The master-problem formulation adds k distinct sets of | S | attack trees
through the iteration k. Since a subset of all the possible alternative sets of attack trees are
added to the M IN M EAN R ISK (4.1) formulation through iteration k, the objective value of
the master problem provides a lower bound to the minimization problem.

4.3

Algorithm M IN M AX

Input: Parameter values for M IN M AX E XP L OSS (3.8) and tolerance  ≥ 0.
Output: Subset of arcs x∗ to deploy security countermeasures with a maximum optimality
gap of .
1. Upper bound, U B := ∞, lower bound LB := 0, current interdiction plan, x∗ :=
x̂1 := 0, iteration counter k := 1.
2. Given an interdiction plan, x̂k , solve the sub-problems M AX L OSS MIP(x̂k ) for all
scenarios s ∈ S to determine the optimal attack plans of the attackers, ŵks and the
associated Āks .
�

P
P
1
s s
s s
3. Calculate f (x̂k ) :=
. If f (x̂k ) < U B,
s∈S p f (x̂) + λ η + 1−α
s∈S p v
U B := f (x̂k ). Set x̂k as the new best interdiction plan. x∗ := x̂k .
4. If U B − LB ≤ , go to END, otherwise go to next step.
5. Generate new variables ziks for the nodes used in the current attack plan. Add a
constraint (4.1b) and sets of constraints (4.1c), (4.1d), and (4.1f) corresponding to
the sets of nodes (N ks ) and arcs (Āks ) used in the attack scenarios in this iteration k.
6. Solve M IN M EAN R ISKf (A¯k+1 ). If f (Āk+1 ) > LB, LB := f (Āk+1 ) and x∗ :=
x̂k+1 . If U B − LB ≤ , go to END.
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7. Update k = k + 1, go to 2.
8. END: return x∗ as the −optimal solution.
This algorithm is a constraint and column generation algorithm because we add new variables and constraints in each iteration. Now, we explain the theoretical foundation of the
convergence of our algorithm.
Lemma. The master problem produces a new solution at each iteration until convergence.
Proof. We know that at each iteration of the algorithm, a set of | S | attack plans are
generated and added to the master problem, where s ∈ S is the scenario index. Let’s
consider that the master problem solution x̂k at iteration k and the master problem solution
x̂m at iteration m are the same, where m < k. In this case, the set of the sub-problem
solutions ŵm from iteration m repeats at iteration k. So, the optimal attack plans ŵms in
the set of sub-problem solutions from iteration m are not interdicted by the master problem
solution at iteration k. Now, the master problem objective value f (Āk ) at iteration k is
at least as large as the mean-risk expected maximum loss f (x̂m ) from the set of subproblem solutions at iteration m. As the current LB ≥ f (Āk ) ≥ f (x̂m ) and current
U B ≤ f (x̂m ), LB ≥ U B which is the convergence criteria of the algorithm. Therefore,
at each iteration, the master problem must generate a new solution to interdict the set of
attack plans generated until convergence.
Theorem. The algorithm MinMax converges within a fnite number of iterations.
Proof. From Lemma (4.3), we see that at each iteration of the algorithm, the master problem generates a new feasible interdiction plan. Suppose there are Z feasible interdiction
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plans. The algorithm will continue through a maximum of Z iterations and add all feasible
sets of attack plans. So, running through Z iterations, the algorithm will explore all the
possible attack plans, implying that the algorithm converges within Z iterations.

4.4

Algorithm Example
To demonstrate the solution algorithm, we describe the steps of the algorithm with

a simple example attack graph as shown in fgure 2.3, where we consider a risk-averse
network defender with a budget of 1 unit. We consider two attackers with budgets of 2
units and 3 units respectively. The attack cost and countermeasure deployment cost is 1
unit for all the arcs. The risk coeffcient and the level of confdence are assumed to be 0.1
unit and 90 percent respectively. Each of the sub-fgures of fgure 4.1 represents either the
attacker’s solution or the defender’s solution. The dashed arcs represent the arcs interdicted
by the defender.
At iteration 1, there is no interdiction of arcs, so the two attackers choose their optimal
attack plan to maximize the loss to the defender. Attacker 1 use the set of arcs {(1, 2), (2,
5)} and the attacker 2 use the set of arcs {(1, 2), (2, 4), (2, 5)} as shown in fgure 4.1a.
These attack plans of the two attackers results in a mean-risk expected maximum loss of
15.29 (= 0.5 × 12.47 + 0.5 × 15.11 + 0.1(14.85 + 0.5 × 0.26)) to the defender, which is the
new upper bound. Now, at the beginning of iteration 2, the defender takes into account the
previous attack plans of the two attackers and generates an interdiction plan that minimizes
the mean-risk expected maximum loss. Here, the optimal interdiction plan of the defender
is to interdict arc (1, 2) as shown in fgure 4.1b, which protects the defender from incurring
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any loss. Given that arc (1, 2) is interdicted, the two attackers choose new attack plans as
shown in fgure 4.1c that results in a new upper bound of 14.37.
At iteration 3, the defender observes all the previous attack plans of iteration 1 and of
iteration 2 and interdict arc (2, 5) which results in a lower bound of 1.59. We see that as
the algorithm proceeds the upper and lower bound of the algorithm are updated gradually.
This process continues until the bounds of the algorithm converges to an optimal objective
value, which is 5.92 resulting from interdicting arc (2, 5).

(a) Iteration 1: Attacker’s solution. No interdiction, the attack plans of two attackers
result in an upper bound = 15.29

(c) Iteration 2: Attacker’s solution.
New attack plans are generated and
new upper bound is = 14.37

(b) Iteration 2: Defender’s solution. Optimal
interdiction results in a lower bound = 0

(d) Iteration 3: Defender’s solution.
New interdiction plan results in a lower bound = 1.59

Figure 4.1: Algorithm Example
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4.5

Acceleration Techniques
In the M IN M EAN R ISK algorithm, we are adding variables and constraints for each

nodes and arcs used in a new attack at each iteration. Due to adding these large number of
variables and constraints in each iteration, the master problem computation time increases
exponentially in the problem size. To improve the computational effciency, we implement
the following enhancements to the algorithm.

4.5.1

Path Based Formulation

Nandi et al. [18] showed that an attacker solution can be represented by a distinct set of
paths. We run a search algorithm on the attacker solutions of each scenario at each iteration
to fnd the set of paths used by the attackers and compute the probability of success of an
attack through a path. Once a new path is found in an iteration, we add a path variable (up )
and the associated constraints to the master problem. If a path is found that was already
used in a previous attack scenario, we also add the path to the associated constraints. The
path based formulation (M IN M EAN R ISK PATH) of the master problem is as follows:
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f (Āk ) = min θ

(4.2a)
⎛

s.t.

θ≥

X

⎞

ps ⎝

X

Cpb Pps (1 − up )⎠

p∈Pks

s∈S

!
X
1
+λ η k +
ps v ks
∀k ∈ K
1 − α s∈S
X
up ≤
xij
∀p ∈ ∪k∈K,s∈S Pks

(4.2b)
(4.2c)

(i,j)∈Ap

up ≤ 1
X

∀p ∈ ∪k∈K,s∈S Pks

(4.2d)

Cijd xij ≤ Bd

(4.2e)

(i,j)∈A

v ks ≥

X

Cpb Pps (1 − up ) − η k

∀k ∈ K, ∀s ∈ S

(4.2f)

s
p∈Pk

xij ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ A

(4.2g)

ηk ∈ R

∀k ∈ K

(4.2h)

v ks ≥ 0

∀k ∈ K, ∀s ∈ S

(4.2i)

up ≥ 0

∀p ∈ ∪k∈K,s∈S Pks

(4.2j)

Each constraint (4.2b) computes the mean-risk expected maximum loss at iteration k.
The objective (4.2a) and constraints (4.2b) together ensure that the algorithm minimizes the
maximum of all the mean-risk expected maximum losses over the iterations up to K. For
each path p, each pair of the constraints (4.2c) and (4.2d) ensure that the path is interdicted
if only one arc in that path is interdicted. Constraint (4.2e) represents the budget limitation
of the defender. Constraints (4.2f) computes the excess loss over all the scenarios in each
iteration. The binary restrictions of the interdiction variables are imposed by constraints
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(4.2g). Constraints (4.2h), (4.2i), and (4.2j) stand for the sign restrictions of the associated
variables. This M IN M EAN R ISK PATH formulation adds much fewer variables and constraints to the master problem at each iteration than the previous M IN M EAN R ISK (4.1)
formulation and thus reduces the master problem computation time.

4.5.2

Multiple Sub-Problem Solutions (Ms)

In our model, each scenario represents an attacker problem or the sub-problem. If
we add only one solution from each scenario sub-problem to the master problem at each
iteration, the algorithm runs through a large number of iterations until enough attacker
solutions are added for convergence. To reduce the number of iterations and thus ensure
quick convergence, we add multiple optimal and sub-optimal solutions of a scenario subproblem to the master problem. (Gurobi optimizer provides multiple optimal and suboptimal solutions to the attacker problems). Adding these multiple sub-problem solutions
to the master problem reduces the number of iterations and the average computation time.
The computational experiments below demonstrate that adding the best 30% of solutions
provides the best results.

4.5.3

Trust Region Constraints (Tr)

At the initial iterations of the M IN M EAN R ISK PATH (4.2) formulation the model produces very divergent solutions, resulting in a long time until convergence. To stabilize the
master problem solution at the initial iterations, we add a trust region cut to the master
problem in the early iterations of the algorithm. If x̂k is the master problem solution for
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iteration k and X̂k1 = {(i, j) : x̂kij = 1} then the trust region cut added to the master
problem at iteration k + 1 is as follows:

X
(i,j)∈
/X̂k1

xij +

X

ˆk |
(1 − xij ) ≤ 0.40 × 2× | X
1

(4.3)

(i,j)∈X̂k1

This constraint (4.3) ensures that the maximum change in the arc interdiction between
iteration k and k + 1 is for 40% of the arcs. The left hand side of the constraint (4.3)
calculates the hamming distance between the interdiction plans of iteration k and iteration
k+1. The right side of the constraint (4.3) forces that among the interdicted arcs at iteration
k, a maximum of one-third can be replaced at iteration k + 1. Experiments show that the
trust region cut reduces the master problem solution time and the algorithm runtime.

4.5.4

Heuristic Solution to Master Problem (Hf)

To obtain better solution of the master problem quickly, we use a heuristic to generate
a solution that is used as a warm start to the master problem solution. Our heuristic is
similar to the greedy heuristic proposed by Toyoda [44] and Nandi et al. [18]. The heuristic
involves the following steps to generate an interdiction plan:
1. Set Xij = 0 and TCost= 0. Xij is the set of arcs to be interdicted and TCost is the
total cost of interdiction.
Saving

2. While T Cost+ICostij ≤ T Budgt, compute the metric, Scoreij = ICostijij for each
of the arcs not yet interdicted. Here, ICostij is the interdiction cost of the arc (i, j)
and T Budgt is the budget of the defender. Savingij is the difference between the
current maximum mean-risk expected maximum loss and the maximum mean-risk
expected maximum loss after the arc (i, j) is interdicted.
3. Interdict the arc that has maximum Scoreij found in step 2 and add this arc (i, j) to
set Xij . Update T Cost = T Cost + ICostij
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4. If T Cost < T Budgt, go to step 2. Otherwise return Xij . This solution from the
heuristic is not the optimal solution of the master problem, but it helps to reach the
optimal solution quickly. So, rather than using the solution as a master problem solution, we use this solution as a warm start to the master problem solution procedure
in the algorithm.

4.5.5

Separation of Sub-problem Solutions (Ss)

At each iteration of the algorithm, we add an attacker solution for each of the scenario
sub-problems to the master problem. To add more different attacker solutions to the master
problem, we add a constraint to each of the scenario sub-problems at the frst few iterations
of the algorithm that forces the sub-problems to generate different attack plans between
two consecutive iterations. These sub-problem separation constraints ensure that enough
attacker solutions are explored more quickly by the master problem and thus signifcantly
reduce both the number of iterations to converge and the average computation time.
ˆ ks =
Assume that ŵks is the solution of the scenario sub-problem s at iteration k and W
1
{(i, j) : ŵijks = 1}. Then, we add the following constraint to the scenario sub-problem s
at iteration k + 1.

X
ˆ ks
(i,j)∈
/W
1

wijks +

X

(1 − wijks ) ≥ 0.10 × 2× | Ŵ1ks |

(4.4)

ˆ ks
(i,j)∈W
1

The left hand side of the constraint (4.4) computes the Hamming distance between the
optimal attack plans of scenario s of iteration k and k + 1. The right side of the constraint
(4.4) forces that at least 10% of the arcs chosen by the optimal attacker solution in scenario
s at iteration k should not be selected by the optimal attacker solution of scenario s at
iteration k + 1. We add these constraints at the few initial iterations of the algorithm. This
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is a novel acceleration technique and the experiments show that this reduces the average
master problem computation time by approximately 18%.

38

CHAPTER V
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS

We performed computational experiments to evaluate the performance of our riskaverse bi-level stochastic programming model on minimizing the mean-risk expected maximum loss from cyber attacks. We analyzed the effects of the model parameters and the
topological attributes of the attack graphs on computation time of the algorithm. We conducted all the experiments on a laptop with an Intel core i7 2.80GHz processor and 8GB
RAM. The algorithms were implemented in Python 2.7 with Gurobi optimizer [45].

5.1

Parameter Set-up
We performed experiments on synthetic attack graphs that are generated using the same

approach as in Nandi et al. [18]. We refer the readers to Nandi et al. [18] for more
detail on the attack graph generation procedure. We conducted numerical experiments
using 4 different sizes of attack graphs each having 5 levels to demonstrate the effects of
network topology on computation time. The following graph parameters: breach loss of
the goal nodes, cost of attack through each arc, cost of deploying countermeasure on each
arc were generated using a Uniform distribution. The mean probabilities of success of
attack through arcs were also generated using a Uniform distribution.
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We modeled the random attack budget using Normal and Weibull distributions. To
construct right-tailed asymmetric attacker budget distribution, we used Weibull distribution. We discretized the continuous Normal and Weibull distribution to obtain discrete
attacker budget distribution. To demonstrate the effects of the risk parameters, we performed experiments with two different levels of confdence level α and several levels of
risk coeffcient λ. Table 5.1 shows the different parameters along with their values used
in our experiments. The base confgurations of the parameters are boldfaced in table 5.1.
In the numerical experiments, all parameters are set at their base values unless otherwise
specifed.

Table 5.1: Parameters and their values used in the experiments
Parameters
Values
Network size (nodes, | N |)
Arcs, | A |
Breach loss of the goal nodes
Cost of attacks through arcs, Cija
Cost of countermeasures deployment
on arcs, Cijd
Defender Budget, Bd
Attacker Budget, Ba
Probability of attack success, pij
Number of scenarios, | S | (low, high)
Level of confdence, α (low, high)
Risk coeffcient, λ

50, 100, 150, 200
≈2.15×| N |
~Uniform(500, 1500), ~Uniform(200, 2000)
~Uniform(10, 30)
~Uniform(10, 30)
100, 150, 200, 255
~Normal(300, 60), ~Weibull(100, 200),
Weibull(50,500)
~Uniform(0, 1)
(100, 150)
(0.7, 0.9)
(0-100)
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5.2

Runtime and Solution Quality of Algorithms
This section presents the results on the computation time of the path-based algorithm,

effects of the acceleration techniques on the computational speed and solution quality of
the exact algorithm, effects of the network size and the number of scenario on the algorithm
runtime.
We performed all the computational experiments with the path-based formulation of
our algorithm (M IN M EAN R ISK PATH (4.2)) as it was shown in Nandi et al. [18] that the
path based formulation outperforms the node based formulation on computational speed.
In this sub-section, we set the parameter values as follows: Bd = 100, Ba ∼ w(80, 180)
for 50-node network; Bd = 150, Ba ∼ w(100, 200) for 100-node and 150-node network;
Bd = 200, Ba ∼ w(150, 250) for 200-node network; and λ = 0.1.
The total runtime, master problem computation time, and solution quality of the basic
algorithm (EA) and with the acceleration techniques are presented in table 5.2, table 5.3,
and fgure 5.1. The notations used in table 5.2, table 5.3, and fgure 5.1 have the following
meaning: EA - Basic path-based algorithm (M IN M EAN R ISK PATH(4.2)) without any acceleration technique, All_ACC- Path based algorithm with all the acceleration techniques,
MMs - Path-based algorithm with the addition of multiple attacker solution (Ms) for each
attack scenario at an iteration, MTr - Path-based algorithm with the trust region cut constraints (Tr) added to the master problem, MHf - Path-based algorithm with a heuristic
to provide a warm start to the master problem solution, MSs - Path-based algorithm with
sub-problem separation constraints added to the master problem, MNl - Path-based algorithm with a limit to the number of nodes that the master problem solver can explore in the
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master problem branch-and-bound tree, MTrSsNl - Path-based algorithm with trust region
cut constraints, sub-problem separation constraints, and node limit method added to the
master problem.
The total runtime and the master problem solution time of the basic M IN M EAN R ISK PATH
algorithm (EA) and with all the acceleration techniques (All_ACC) for four different size
of attack graphs are provided in table 5.2. Four random instances of graphs are used for
each graph size. All the graphs are of level = 5. Asterisk (*) means that those graphs cannot
be solved in 2 hours. Ttime, and masTime as the column labels stands for total runtime,
and master problem runtime, respectively for problems with 100 scenarios. It is seen that
the computation time increases at a high rate as the size of the network increases. Especially, the computation time of the EA is highly affected by the network size. The basic
path-based algorithm cannot solve most of the 150-node and 200- node networks within 2
hours as shown in table 5.2. However, implementation of the acceleration methods enable
the algorithm to solve 150-node and 200-node networks within a reasonable time. Therefore, in conjunction with the acceleration techniques, the M IN M EAN R ISK PATH algorithm
can solve large network problems within a reasonable time.
Experiments show that in the initial iterations of the algorithm, the solution of scenario
sub-problems consumes more time than the solution time of master problem. However, as
the number of iteration increases, more variables and constraints are added to the master
problem resulting an increase in the size of the master problem and thus increases the
master problem computation time sharply.
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Table 5.2: Growth of the computation time (clock seconds) with graph size
Graph Params

All_ACC

EA

Nodes

Arcs

Ttime

masTime

Ttime

masTime

50

118

193.07

3.72

428.89

35.61

50

126

215.58

2.77

592.70

10.66

50

119

182.72

3.22

286.72

32.13

50

116

130.24

2.07

180.59

3.66

100

237

419.17

10.77

711.66

87.13

100

235

949.60

17.17

3490.75

1306.01

100

230

1143.75

17.29

3096.35

1023.50

100

248

808.70

5.94

4074.57

676.07

150

374

1861.49

20.53

*

*

150

374

1999.04

18.64

*

*

150

345

869.49

8.62

2843.56

619.10

150

352

2089.01

16.91

*

*

200

431

3246.30

20.67

*

*

200

437

2050.04

30.72

*

*

200

425

2910.97

28.29

*

*

200

424

1783.49

27.10

*

*

As a result, the contribution of the master problem solution time to the total runtime
of the EA is larger than the contribution of the master problem solution time to the total
runtime of the All_ACC method. This is likely because the acceleration methods focus on
reducing the master problem solution time only. This is evident from the comparison of the
masTime columns of the exact algorithm (EA) and the accelerated algorithm (All_ACC)
in table 5.2.
From table 5.2 we observe that the solution times of the networks of the same size
varies signifcantly. Because the attack graphs are generated randomly which makes the
topologies of the graphs to be different. These different topologies makes the solution
times of the same size graphs to be different. Moreover, the difference in graph topology
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also affects the performance of acceleration techniques. Also, the randomly generated
mean probabilities of attack success on arcs results the computation times of the same size
networks to be different. It is seen from table 5.2 that in some cases the solution time
of 150-node problem is more than the solution time of 200-node problem in All_ACC
method.

Figure 5.1: Average computation times (clock seconds) on four 100-nodes attack graphs
of level 5 for each of the exact algorithm and the acceleration techniques

The effects of the different acceleration techniques to the average computation time of
the M IN M EAN R ISK PATH algorithm are presented in fgure 5.1 which demonstrates that
most of the acceleration techniques contribute to reduce the average computation time of
our path-based algorithm. Especially, the node limit method (MNl) reduces the average
computation time of the EA by a larger percentage compared to all other acceleration techniques when applied individually. The trust region cut (MTr) reduces the computation
time of the EA for some instances and in some instances the computation time is higher
that slightly increases the average computation time. The sub-problem separation method
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(MSs) provides better reduction in the average computation time compared to the master
problem heuristic (MHf) and trust region cut (MTr) methods. This novel acceleration technique provides an average reduction of 18% of the master problem computation time of
the EA for the 100-node network. It is seen that the reduction of the average computation
time in MNl, MTrSsNl, and All_ACC method are almost same. We see the average computation time of the master problem heuristic (MHf) method for the 100-node networks is
larger than the EA.
From the experiments, we see that the application of MMs method reduces the average
computation time of the EA in solving the 50-node network. But, in solving the 100node networks with MMs method, the computation time becomes higher than the EA. The
objective of MMs method is to add more attacker solution to the master problem in each
iteration so that the algorithm converges within a small number of iteration. However,
if the size of the network is large then a large number of variables and constraints are
added to the master problem in each iteration which increases the solution time of each
iteration. In a 50-node network, the problem size is not so large as in a 100-node network
and each iteration is not taking longer time. So, it is possible in a 50-node network to
reduce the computation time by reducing the total number of iterations. As our problem
is stochastic, in a 100-node network, the problem size increases signifcantly due to the
addition of multiple solutions for each attack scenario in each iteration. Therefore, despite
reducing the total number of iteration, the solution time of each iteration increases by a
large amount. This makes the MMs method to take longer time than EA in solving larger
networks.
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Table 5.3 demonstrates the mean-risk expected maximum loss (MRE XP L OSS), master
problem solution time, and the solution quality of the exact algorithm and with the acceleration techniques. In table 5.3, the MRE XP L OSS, masTime, and %Δ are, respectively,
short for mean-risk expected maximum loss, master problem runtime, and the percentage
by which the MRE XP L OSS from the acceleration methods is higher than the MRE X P L OSS

from EA.We see from table 5.3 that the master problem computation times of the

100-node networks from All_ACC method are higher than the master problem computation times from the MNl and MTrSsNl method. Because the computation time of the MMs
and MHf methods for 100-node networks are higher than the computation time of EA.
So, removing these acceleration techniques from the All_ACC method reduces the master
problem computation time of the 100-node networks, which is evident from the master
problem computation times of MTrSsNl method. But, removing multiple subproblem solution (Ms) and the master problem heuristic (Hf) from the All_ACC method impairs the
solution quality. The MMs and Hf tend to improve the poor solution resulting from the
node limit method. The MHf method increases the solution quality as it provides a better
start-up to the master problem solver. So, though the average master problem computation
time of the 100-node networks from the All_ACC method is slightly higher compared to
the MNl and MTrSsNl method, the All_ACC method provides better solution quality than
MNl and MTrSsNl as shown in table 5.3. We also see from table 5.3 that the solutions
provided by the MNl, MTrSsNl, and All_ACC methods are optimal for all the 50-node
network instances.
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Table 5.3: Solution quality and computation time (clock seconds) of the acceleration techniques (MNl, All_ACC, and MTrSsNl) compared to the exact algorithm (EA)
Graph Params

EA

MNl

All_ACC

MTrSsNl

Nodes

MRE XP L OSS

masTime

masTime

%Δ

masTime

%Δ

masTime

%Δ

50

175.87

35.61

4.39

0

3.72

0

5.67

0

50

258.88

10.65

5.66

0

2.77

0

7.05

0

50

251.63

32.13

4.94

0

3.22

0

4.55

0

50

225.82

3.66

1.68

0

2.07

0

1.02

0

100

315.16

87.13

7.12

12.49

10.77

11.47

4.68

12.47

100

426.49

1306.01

10.02

3.11

17.17

3.11

4.22

3.11

100

521.92

1023.5

5.69

12.12

17.29

1.00

6.59

10.56

100

555.65

676.07

4.51

3.17

5.94

2.65

5.31

3.17

Table 5.4 shows the variation of computation time with the number of scenarios in the
stochastic programming problem. In table 5.4, two random instances of graphs are used for
each graph size of levels = 5. Ttime represents the total runtime of the All_ACC method
for 100 and 150 scenarios. We see that the computation time of the algorithm increases as
the number of scenarios in the problem increases.
Experiments also show that the computation time increases as the defender’s budget
increases. With more budget, the defender can interdict more attack paths requiring to
explore larger combination of possible attack paths, increasing the computation time.
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Table 5.4: Increase in computation time (clock seconds) with number of scenario
Graph Size

5.3

Ttime

Nodes

Arcs

| S |= 100

| S |= 150

50

118

193.07

397.07

50

126

215.58

359.57

100

237

419.17

636.99

100

235

949.60

1285.61

150

374

1861.49

2680.61

150

374

1999.04

5477.53

200

431

3246.30

7095.72

200

437

2050.04

3498.20

Effect of Defender’s Budget on Mean-Risk Expected Maximum Loss
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the variation of the mean-risk expected maximum loss with

the budget of the defender. The average mean-risk expected maximum loss of the four
graphs is also shown in fgure 5.2. For a specifc budget, the average loss is computed by
simply averaging the losses of the four graphs.

Figure 5.2: Variation of mean-risk expected maximum loss with defender’s budget for four
different graphs each with 100-nodes.
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As the defender’s budget increases, she can interdict more attack path resulting in a
lower mean-risk expected maximum loss. However, with the budget increment, the loss
does not decrease at a constant rate. This is because, at the beginning, the defender can
overcome the relatively easy security challenges with a small increase in the budget. After
that a same amount of increase in the budget is not enough to protect the next critical assets.
The network defender can use fgure 5.2 to choose the amount she has to invest in network
interdiction depending on the amount of mean-risk expected maximum loss she is willing
to compromise. For example, for the attack graph 4, a network defender may choose to
invest 400 units because at this point the curve levels off, resulting in a small marginal
decrease in mean-risk expected maximum loss.

5.4

Effects of Risk Parameters on Interdiction Policy, CVaR, and Mean-Risk Expected Maximum Loss
In our risk-averse stochastic network interdiction framework we have two risk parame-

ters: level of confdence, α and the risk coeffcient, λ. The experimental results in this section show the effects of incorporating the risk measure in minimizing the loss from cyber
attacks with random attacker budget. Figure 5.3 shows the variation of mean-risk expected
maximum loss, expected maximum loss, and the conditional-value-at-risk with the risk coeffcient (λ) for two different values of confdence level α = 0.7 and α = 0.9. For these experiments, other parameters are set as:| N |= 50, | S |= 40, Bd = 255, Ba ∼ w(50, 500).
Conditional-value-at-risk at a given level α quantifes the expected value of the worst
(1 − α)% of the losses. Figure 5.3 demonstrates that the mean-risk expected maximum
loss and the conditional-value-at-risk become larger for larger α levels. A higher level
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of α means that the decision maker is concerned about the realizations corresponding to
larger losses. So, as the α level increases, the corresponding value-at-risk increases and the
CV aRα increases. Therefore, the larger value of α results in more conservative policies
and provide more concern to the scenarios corresponding to larger losses.
The risk coeffcient (λ) represents the relative importance between the expected maximum loss and the CVaR component. As the value of λ increases, the relative importance
of the CVaR component increases and thus leads to more risk-averse policies. It is evident
from fgure 5.3b that the CVaR component decreases as the value of λ increases.

(a) Mean-risk expected maximum loss vs λ

(b) Conditional value at risk vs λ

(c) Expected maximum loss vs λ for two α levels.

Figure 5.3: Variation of mean-risk expected maximum loss, expected maximum loss, and
conditional-value-at-risk with risk coeffcient λ for two different confdence
levels
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As the value of λ increases, relatively less importance is given to the minimization of
the expectation criteria, and thus the expected maximum loss increases which is demonstrated in fgure 5.3c. With more risk-averse policies, the mean-risk expected maximum
loss also increases which is demonstrated in fgure 5.3a. It is seen that as the value of λor
α increases, the mean-risk expected maximum loss increases.
One important fnding of our research is that the effect of the λ parameter on CV aRα
depends on the distribution of the attacker budget. If the distribution of the attacker budget
is symmetric as shown in fgure 5.4a, the CV aRα decreases by a smaller amount as the
value of λ increases compared to a right-tailed asymmetric distribution. We see from fgure
5.4a that the CV aR0.9 decreases by 10.56 % (at λ = 0, CV aR0.9 = 1003 and at λ = 10,
CV aR0.9 = 897) as the value of λ increases from 0 to 10. In a symmetric distribution
of the attacker budget, the probability of the scenarios with large attacker budget is high.
So, the number of scenarios with high attacker budget is large and thus the frequency of
the larger losses is also high in the distribution of losses from the scenarios. In this case,
the objective of minimizing the expectation criteria is also partially taking into account the
objective of minimization of the expected maximum loss from the most damaging attack
scenarios. In other words, providing more importance to minimize the expected value of
the larger losses separately is not highly signifcant as the optimal interdiction decision
under a risk-neutral preference is also trying to minimize the larger losses.

On the other hand, if the distribution of attacker budget is a right-tailed asymmetric
distribution (e.g. Weibull distribution), the percentage decrease in CV aRα becomes larger
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as the value of λ increases. For the right-tailed attacker budget distribution as shown in
fgure 5.4b, the reduction in CV aR0.9 is 29.98% (at λ = 0, CV aR0.9 = 1521 and at
λ = 10, CV aR0.9 = 1065) as the value of λ increases from 0 to 10. In a right-tailed
asymmetric distribution, the probability of the scenarios with high attacker budget is very
small. So, only few scenarios have an extremely high attacker budget and the frequency
of larger losses is also low. As the expectation criteria is concerned about minimizing
the expected maximum loss, in this case the risk-neutral approach is minimizing only the
expected maximum loss over all scenarios. The risk-neutral optimal interdiction plan is
not taking into account the few larger loss scenarios. So, as the value of λ increases,
more importance is given to the minimization of the mean of the larger loss scenarios, the
optimal interdiction decision is made to minimize the CV aRα .
Moreover, in real life cyber attacks, most attacks are conducted by attackers with low
attack capability which we represent in our problem as attacker budget.

(a) Symmetric distribution of attacker budget

(b) Asymmetric distribution of attacker budget

Figure 5.4: Variation of the effect of λ on CV aRα with the distribution of attacker budget
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Only few attackers have a very high skill to make a severe loss to an organization.
So, the distribution of real world attacker capabilities is also likely to be a right-tailed
asymmetric distribution. Therefore, our model better represents this real-world context.

5.5 Signifcance of Incorporating Multiple Attacker and Risk-Aversion
One research question in this study is: how much improvement do we obtain by modeling multiple attackers via an uncertain attacker budget as opposed to a single attacker with
a known budget? To answer this question in the context of a risk-neutral approach, we
usually evaluate a metric called value of stochastic solution (VSS). The VSS indicates the
cost of not considering the randomness in the stochastic problem parameters. This VSS
is computed as: V SS = EV P − SP , where the EVP stands for the expected cost that
results from using the expected value problem solution and SP stands for the expected cost
provided by the stochastic problem solution. In the expected value problem, the expected
value of the random parameters in the scenarios is used. However, in this thesis, we are
concerned about risk-averse stochastic programming problem, so we adopt an equivalent
measure of VSS for the mean-risk stochastic program, like Noyan [35]. We refer this
measure as mean-risk value of stochastic solution (MRVSS), which is computed using the
following formula:

M RV SS = M REV P − M RSP
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(5.1)

M REV P = E(f (x̄(ξ¯), ξ) + λCV aRα (f (x̄(ξ¯), ξ)

(5.2)

M RSP = E(f (x, ξ)) + λCV aRα (f (x, ξ))

(5.3)

Here, x̄(ξ¯) represents the optimal solution of the expected value problem, and x stands
for the optimal solution of the stochastic problem. MREVP and MRSP represents the
mean-risk expected cost resulting from using the expected value problem solution and the
stochastic problem solution, respectively. The larger the value of MRVSS, the higher the
signifcance of incorporating the randomness in the parameters of a risk-averse stochastic
programming model with a specifed risk measure compared to solving the deterministic
problem. Computational experiments are performed to explore the signifcance of incorporating the randomness in the attacker budget in our mean-risk network interdiction model.
As the attackers have different budget values, an interdiction plan generated based on the
expected attacker budget is likely to be erroneous and results a positive MRVSS. Table
5.5 demonstrates the MRVSS for different values of λ and α. In these experiments, other
parameter values are set as: | N |= 50, | S |= 40, Bd = 255, Ba ∼ w(50, 500). We
see that the value of stochastic solution for the risk neutral approach (λ = 0) is small. So,
modeling randomness in the attacker budget using a risk-neutral approach doesn’t provide
a more robust interdiction plan than the deterministic problem.
On the other hand, a risk-averse approach is more benefcial to model the randomness
in the attacker budget than the risk-neutral approach. A more risk-averse approach results
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a larger MRVSS compared to risk-neutral approach, as shown in table 5.5. We see that the
MRVSS increases as the risk parameters λ and α increases. In other words, as the decision
maker increases the level of risk-aversion, the signifcance of solving a risk-averse model
increases. This is because, unlike the deterministic and risk-neutral model, with higher
risk-aversion, the risk-averse model tries to minimize the expected value of the larger losses
more in addition to minimizing the overall expected loss. This results a lower mean-risk
expected maximum loss in using a risk-averse solution as opposed to using an expected
value solution or risk-neutral solution. Therefore, in the presence of uncertainty, a riskaverse approach provides a more robust interdiction decision compared to a deterministic
as well as a risk-neutral approach.

Table 5.5: Variation of MRVSS with risk parameters
Risk Coeffcient (λ)

MRVSS (%)
α = 0.7

α = 0.9

0

6.74

6.74

0.1

6.79

6.98

0.5

16.13

19.19

1

23.01

27.40

5

35.08

41.82

10

37.56

44.78

To demonstrate the cost of ignoring risk-aversion where the network defender is actually risk-averse, we introduce a metric called value of risk-aversion (VRA) and compute
using the following formula:

V RA = RN SP − M RSP
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(5.4)

RN SP = E(f (xRN , ξ)) + λCV aRα (f (xRN , ξ))

(5.5)

Here, xRN and RNSP stands for the optimal solution of the risk-neutral stochastic program and the mean-risk expected maximum loss resulting from using xRN , respectively.
Table 5.6 shows the variation of the VRA with the risk parameters λ and α. In these experiments, other parameter values are set as: | N |= 50, | S |= 40, Bd = 255, Ba ∼
w(50, 500). We see from table 5.6 that as the value of λ and α increases, the VRA increases. With a larger λ, the network defender is more risk-averse; thus, using a riskneutral solution cannot minimize the expected value of the larger losses (CVaR), and results a higher mean-risk expected maximum loss. On the other hand, a risk-averse solution
can better minimize the expected value of the larger losses in addition to minimization of
the expected maximum loss over all scenarios. Though the risk-averse solution results an
increase in the expected maximum loss over all scenarios than a risk-neutral solution, the
overall objective value (MRE XP L OSS) from using a risk-averse solution is much smaller
as opposed to that of risk-neutral solution. This is because a risk-averse solution minimizes the CVaR component by a larger percentage that offsets the increase in the expected
maximum loss. Thus, our results indicate that it is important to use a risk-averse model to
model a risk-averse network defender.
With a larger α, the defender is concerned about minimizing the larger loss scenarios,
which requires them to use a risk-averse solution. So, the signifcance of using a risk-averse
solution over a risk-neutral solution increases as the α increases. Therefore, In the case of
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high variability in attacker budget, a risk-averse solution is more robust than a risk-neutral
one.

Table 5.6: Variation of VRA with risk parameters
Risk Coeffcient (λ)

VRA (%)
α = 0.7

α = 0.9

0.1

0

0

0.5

9.90

12.97

1

16.88

21.33

5

29.03

35.87

10

31.53

38.86
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

We studied the problem of optimally interdicting the cyber network of an organization
from the standpoint of a risk-averse network defender. In this thesis, we presented a meanrisk bi-level stochastic network interdiction model based on the concept of an attack graph.
We adopted the conditional-value-at- risk as a risk measure in our risk-averse model. Both
the inner and outer level of our model were formulated as mixed-integer linear programs.
We developed a customized constraint and column generation algorithm to incorporate the
stochasticity and risk-aversion. Several novel enhancement techniques were proposed to
improve the computational effciency of the base algorithm. We also employed a heuristic
to provide a warm start to the master problem solver.
Computational experiments show that the acceleration techniques signifcantly improve
runtime. Implementing all the acceleration techniques together (All_ACC) provides better computational speed than the individual techniques and better solution quality than
the master problem node limit method (MNl) and the master problem with trust region
cut, sub-problem separation, and node limit added together (MTrSsNl). Though MNl
and MTrSsNl provides better reduction of the master problem computation time than the
All_ACC method, their solution quality is poor. When applied individually, the master
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problem node limit method provides the better computational effciency than any other acceleration techniques. However, this node limit method also impairs the solution quality.
The novel acceleration technique, sub-problem separation, provides an average reduction
of 18% to the master problem solution time without affecting the solution quality. After
applying the acceleration techniques, the major contribution to the total computation time
is from the sub-problem solution time. This is because, the acceleration techniques only
reduces the master problem solution time. Solution time increases with the size of the
network and the number of scenarios.
We also found that the mean-risk expected maximum loss decreases with the defender’s
budget. However, the rate of change is not uniform with the defender’s budget. The meanrisk expected maximum loss decreases sharply at the beginning when it is easy for the
defender to overcome the relatively easy security challenges with a small increment of
budget.
Our experiments provide the insights about the effects of risk-aversion on the optimal
interdiction decision. The larger the value of the risk parameters, the more conservative
are the interdiction policies. As the risk coeffcient (λ) increases, the optimal interdiction
plan is generated by giving relatively more importance to minimize the expected maximum
loss from the most damaging attack scenarios than the expected maximum loss over all the
scenarios, and thus conditional-value-at-risk at level α decreases. However, the effect of λ
on optimal interdiction policy and in turn on conditional-value-at-risk at level α depends
on the distribution of attacker budget. The effect of λ on conditional-value-at-risk is more
evident when a few attackers have extremely high budget, i.e., the distribution is heavy
59

right-tailed. As the value of α increases, the decision maker is more concerned to minimize
the larger loss scenarios leading to an increase in the value-at-risk and, in turn, increases
the conditional-value-at-risk.
Taken together, the experimental results demonstrate the signifcance of modeling the
randomness in attacker budget through a mean-risk stochastic model. Modeling multiple
attacker via uncertain attacker budget in a risk-averse stochastic model provides more robust interdiction decision than the interdiction decision from a deterministic model with
a single attacker. The mean-risk value of stochastic solution increases as the decision
maker becomes more risk-averse. Results also show the signifcance of solving a riskaverse model over a risk-neutral one. The value of risk-aversion increases as the network
defender becomes more risk-averse.

6.1

Research Limitations and Future Work
In this study, we assumed perfect interdiction. However, this assumption could be

relaxed to incorporate imperfect, multi-level interdiction, where the higher the countermeasure cost on an arc, the lower the probability of success of attack through that arc. This
could be incorporated by formulating the model as a stochastic program with decision
dependent uncertainty. In this context, the frst-stage decision of incurring the countermeasure cost affects the probability of success of attacks and in turn affects the scenario
probability. For details of this decision dependent uncertainty framework, see Medal et
al. [46]. From a computational standpoint, we implemented enhancements to reduce the
master problem solution time only. Another extension could be to reduce the overall sub60

problem solution time. One way of doing this is to implement a progressive hedging algorithm which is easy to parallelize. Also, the proposed model and algorithms should be
implemented on real cyber networks rather than synthetic ones.
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